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Abstract
Advances in AI techniques and computing platforms have
triggered a lively and expanding discourse on ethical
decision-making by autonomous agents. Much recent work
in AI concentrates on the challenges of moral decision mak-
ing from a decision-theoretic perspective, and especially the
representation of various ethical dilemmas. Such approaches
may be useful but in general are not productive because moral
decision making is as context-driven as other forms of deci-
sion making, if not more. In contrast, we consider ethics not
from the standpoint of an individual agent but of the wider
sociotechnical systems (STS) in which the agent operates.
Our contribution in this paper is the conception of ethical STS
founded on governance that takes into account stakeholder
values, normative constraints on agents, and outcomes (states
of the STS) that obtain due to actions taken by agents. An im-
portant element of our conception is accountability, which is
necessary for adequate consideration of outcomes that prima
facie appear ethical or unethical. Focusing on STSs avoids the
difficult problems of ethics as the norms of the STS give an
operational basis for agent decision making.
1 Introduction
Advances in computing platforms and artificial intelligence
techniques have led to the situation where machines perform
more and more of the tasks that humans have traditionally
performed (Russell, Dewey, and Tegmark 2015). We refer
to such a machine, potentially consisting of both hardware
and software, as an autonomous agent or agent for short. We
reserve the word system for social entities of two or more
agents. In addition to constrained tasks such as flight con-
trol, which achieved capabilities of near autonomy decades
ago, we see harbingers of autonomous capabilities in vir-
tually any domain of human endeavor. Applications range
from transportation and warehouse automation to healthcare
and education.
A question that has fostered significant interdisciplinary
discussion is whether we can ensure that agents make eth-
ical decisions (Bostrom and Yudkowsky 2014; Conitzer et
al. 2017). Partly this interest stems from science fiction me-
dia that depicts machines that are sentient and self-interested
and may therefore come into conflict with humans. This
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question has inspired various versions of “do no harm to hu-
mans” maxims, from Asimov to Bostrom and Yudkowsky
(2014). And, partly this interest stems from imagining that
agents are deliberative entities who will make choices much
in the same way humans do: faced with a situation that de-
mands deliberation, an agent will line up its choices and
make the best one that is also the most ethical. The trol-
ley problem, a moral dilemma that has been the subject of
extensive philosophical discussion, has been discussed ex-
tensively in the context of self-driving vehicles (Bonnefon,
Shariff, and Rahwan 2016).
Concurrently, there has been an expanding body of work
in the broad AI tradition that investigates designing and
verifying, not individual agents, but sociotechnical systems
(STSs), e.g., (Pitt, Schaumeier, and Artikis 2012; Singh
2013). STSs comprise social entities (principals, such as
people and organizations, who may be represented computa-
tionally by agents) and technical entities (mechanisms, such
as those comprising the infrastructure). In our conception,
STS are computational systems that capture the normative
context for the actions of the participating agents (Chopra
and Singh 2016). There is a huge difference between (a)
using the context merely to inform an agent’s design and
decision making; and (b) formalizing the context itself as
a computational system (with attendant properties such as
specification, composition, execution, and state) and using it
to potentially inform an agent’s design and decision making.
Our formulation of STSs enables us to pose a novel ques-
tion: Is a given STS ethical? This question is crucial to ethics
because whether an agent’s actions are ethical depends upon
whether the relevant STS is ethical. For example, in Vic-
tor Hugo’s Les Mise´rables, the protagonist, Jean Valjean,
steals a loaf of bread to feed his sister’s family. Let us accept
that stealing is unethical as is letting your sister starve when
you can prevent her starvation. Valjean’s actions are uneth-
ical but his alternative was unethical as well: he is truly in
a moral quandary (Richardson 2014). Our approach would
not pass judgment on Valjean’s actions but instead find fault
with the STS (the French society of the book) in which he
functions. The STS is at fault for placing its participant in a
quandary.
In general, an autonomous agent may be a participant
in several STSs, so to be more precise, we ask if the au-
tonomous agent’s actions are ethical from the point of view
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of a given STS. But what does it mean for an STS to be
ethical? This paper’s main contribution is in providing an
answer to this question.
2 Ethics in the Small
Ethics in the small concerns the decision making of individ-
ual agents.
2.1 Atomistic: Single-Agent View
Ethics intrinsically has a normative basis in the sense that
the purpose is to distinguish an agent’s correct actions from
incorrect ones. Although ideas such as moral values and so-
cial norms, as standards of correctness, necessarily arise in
any discussion of ethics and AI, their scope has largely been
limited to the design and impact of autonomous agents.
The design concern is about informing the design of au-
tonomous agents with ideas from ethics. Is it sensible at all
to talk about agents being ethical? Assuming it is, when can
we say an agent is ethical? Are there categories of ethical
agents (Moor 2006)? And, how can we ensure that the agents
we design are ethical? Assuming we had a suitable speci-
fication of ethics, then agent designs could be verified for
ethics. For instance, Dennis et al. (2016) provide a language
to express ethical requirements and an ordering over those
requirements. They give techniques for verifying where an
agent always selects the most ethical plan. In fact, there is
a tradition in multiagent systems research to use deontic
logic toward the verification of agent designs (Meyer and
Wieringa 1993).
The impact concern broadly is about the relationship be-
tween agents and society, though the literature traditionally
approaches them from the standpoint of a single agent. An
important element of impact is accountability (Diakopou-
los 2016), which we address at length later. Specifically,
who would be accountable for the decisions made by an
autonomous agent? For example, it would appear unsatis-
factory for a manufacturer of an autonomous vehicle to de-
sign and sell it but not be accountable for mishaps because
the vehicle was autonomous. Autonomous agents based on
machine learning further complicate the picture because it
is difficult to tell in advance what specific facts an agent
will learn and therefore how it will act (Danks and Lon-
don 2017). Specifically, we may encounter situations where
the autonomous agent behaves correctly as designed but pro-
duces outcomes that are ethically suspect because the facts
it has been trained on are biased or wrong.
Both the design and impact concerns are worthwhile,
though they are inherently too narrowly conceived from the
single-agent perspective.
2.2 Decision-Making, Principles, and Dilemmas
An agent’s decision making involves ingredients such as
these: beliefs about the world, goals, capabilities, and nor-
mative relationships with other agents. An ethically con-
scious agent’s decision making would maximize achieve-
ment of its goals while minimizing violations of its ethics. A
staple of the discussion in literature is how would an agent
act when placed in an ethical dilemma. What makes an eth-
ical dilemma interesting is that all the choices it exposes are
unethical. In the trolley problem, the choice is between let-
ting five people die or saving them but in the process killing
one. The practical problem is to determine the best of the
bad lot of choices. The hope is that solving the question will
shed light on the nature and content of valid ethical princi-
ples.
Centuries of moral philosophy though have yielded no
universal answer about ethical judgments. What philoso-
phers have learned is that we find a number of ethical prin-
ciples useful. For example, Sen (2011) discusses utilitari-
anism, egalitarianism, libertarianism, and so on, and shows
that these principles are not mutually compatible. The list
of ethical principles goes on: Kant’s Categorical Imperative,
Golden Rule, the Doctrine of Double Effect, and so on. As
a way of overcoming the challenges of determining a valid
ethics for autonomous agents, Bonnefon et al. (2016) sug-
gest that their ethics could be informed by empirical stud-
ies of people’s conception of ethics (Bonnefon, Shariff, and
Rahwan 2016).
We claim that though ethical dilemmas may be inter-
esting, they do not yield productive research questions. In
essence, studies that seek people’s opinions about the dilem-
mas are little more than parlor games. And, in addition to
the problem of validity, bounded rationality means that most
broad ethical conceptions and maxims are not operationaliz-
able. How could one possibly compute all the consequences
of one’s action? Motivated by the problem of developing an
agent that is capable of general intelligence (in contrast to
being intelligent in a particular domain, say playing chess or
driving), Bostrom and Yudkowsky propose “any action that
causes no harm to humans is permitted” as the ethical princi-
ple by which the agent should act. It is not clear what would
constitute harm in the first place, let alone one computing
whether harm was caused.
3 STSs from the Standpoint of Ethics
The idea of a sociotechnical system builds upon work on in-
stitutions and organizations of autonomous agents (Artikis,
Sergot, and Pitt 2009; Modgil et al. 2015; King et al. 2015).
A key idea in this body of work is the distinction between
regulation and regimentation (Jones and Sergot 1993). Reg-
ulation is the idea that the norms relevant to the setting
are specified and satisfaction is left up to the agents. Reg-
ulation is thus autonomy-promoting but at the same time
yields explicit standards of correctness. Regimentation is the
idea that interactions between agents can be implemented
in machines; its standards of correctness are implicit. Our
motivation for emphasizing the sociotechnical view is that
a real-life system must embody both a social architecture
(regulatory) and a technical architecture (regimented) (Singh
2015). How to identify and work with the tradeoffs between
them is a crucial challenge (Kafalı, Ajmeri, and Singh 2016;
2017).
We conceive of STSs in terms of three major kinds of
elements: (1) stakeholders; (2) information, namely, stake-
holder values, prescriptive norms, and outcomes, and (3)
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processes for governance, including for purposes of respec-
ifying an STS.
3.1 Values, Norms, and Outcomes
Let’s consider each of these in a hypothetical sociotechni-
cal system for transportation by driverless vehicles. Here the
stakeholders may include automobile owners, passengers,
the public, road authorities, insurance providers, manufac-
turers, garages, and regulatory agencies. Suppose the values
the stakeholders want to promote are comfort and well-being
of owners and passengers, their privacy, economic sustain-
ability, well-being of property, and speed of transportation.
Upon deliberation, the stakeholders come up with the (pre-
scriptive) norms for their STS (values of course don’t deter-
mine norms).
Norms are a general and powerful construct. For con-
creteness, we adopt the conception of regulatory norms ad-
vocated by Von Wright, the father of deontic logic (1963;
1999); we adopt an enhancement of our previous formula-
tion (Singh 2013). We give a few examples of the norms in
relation to selected values—the small caps refer to roles ab-
stracted from stakeholders.
• Promoting well-being. OWNER authorizes MANUFAC-
TURER to apply software updates for enhanced safety and
performance. MANUFACTURER commits to OWNER to ap-
ply all mandated updates. A REGULATORY AGENCY has
been empowered over OWNER to mandate a software up-
date.
• Promoting speed of transportation and safety. ROAD AU-
THORITIES commit to OWNER to provide up to date in-
formation about directions and road conditions. Further,
they commit to all other stakeholders to maintain roads
and information systems up to the required standards.
• Promoting safety of humans and property. OWNER is pro-
hibited by REGULATORY AGENCY from operating the ve-
hicle unless it is certified roadworthy. MANUFACTURER
commits to REGULATORY AGENCY for installing a device
that safely disables driving the car if it operated for more
than an hour without certification. OWNER is empowered
by REGULATORY AGENCY to override the disablement by
declaring an emergency.
• Promoting privacy. MANUFACTURER is authorized by
OWNER to record operational information but prohibited
from sharing it with third parties unless consent is ob-
tained.
• Promoting safety. REGULATORY AGENCY commits to
PUBLIC to monitor, investigate, and document the nature
and causes of incidents.
We adopt the distinction between prescriptive (or injunc-
tive) norms and descriptive norms (Cialdini, Reno, and Kall-
gren 1990). The distinction is that prescriptive norms state
what an agent ought to do whereas the descriptive norms
what agents normally do. For clarity, by norms of an STS,
we always mean its prescriptive norms. And by outcomes,
we mean the state of the STS as represented by the events
that have occurred. The descriptive norms would be some
time-limited aggregation of an STS’s state; they are by def-
inition emergent. Prescriptive norms have regulatory force
and could arise merely from constituting emergent norms in
a process of governance (as we explain below).
For instance, the regulatory agency may be unable to
monitor incidents in bad weather conditions because of fail-
ures of sensors. Some outcomes may even fall outside the
scope of the norms in the sense that they result from actions
that do not result in norm violations but could be in conflict
with the values. For example, the manufacturer may moni-
tor what passengers are talking about in the car and use that
information to target advertisements. Although not in vio-
lation of any specified norm, such monitoring would be in
tension with preserving the privacy of passengers.
3.2 Governance
Governance is an interactive activity among stakeholders
whereby they try to align the norms of an STS with their
values, which may be themselves be informed by ethical
considerations and information about the performance of the
STS, including the behavior of agents and technical compo-
nents. The following three activities are crucial to effective
governance.
Design. Does the STS, conceived of as a specification of
norms, satisfy all stakeholders’ requirements? A related
question is whether adequate consideration was given to
identifying and engaging all potential stakeholders.
Enactment. Did the principals in an STS behave as ex-
pected? For example, assuming an STS for self-driving
cars has been designed, we can ask if a manufacturer de-
signed the car’s control algorithms as expected by safety
standards bodies; if an owner took it for inspection and
maintenance at expected intervals; if a garage applied the
software updates as expected by the manufacturer; and so
on.
Adaptation. The first specification of an STS is unlikely
to be its final one. Data gathered about STS enactments
and changing requirements would inform the adaptation
of the STS. For example, it may be discovered that a cer-
tain model of self-driving car is able to handle an un-
foreseen situation better than other models because of
the sophistication of its control algorithm. Then the STS
may be changed to incorporate the relevant aspects of the
algorithms in the appropriate safety standards. Adapta-
tion is about feeding back outcomes, including descriptive
norms, back into the design of prescriptive norms.
4 Accountability and Its Pitfalls
Autonomy and accountability are fundamental concepts
in understanding sociotechnical systems. Autonomy means
each principal is free to act as it pleases; accountability
means that a principal may be called upon to account for
its actions. In general, balancing autonomy and accountabil-
ity is crucial for ensuring that an STS would not devolve into
the extremes of chaos or tyranny.
We understand an agent’s autonomy not merely in cogni-
tive terms, that is, as a matter of its intelligence and capa-
bilities, but also the ability to do the unexpected in violation
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of applicable norms, social or personal. Innovation presup-
poses the willingness to deviate from norms. Therefore, ac-
countability becomes all important in light of autonomy, for
to be accountable to someone means that you can get called
up to explain your actions.
Accountability is classically understood, e.g., in po-
litical theory (Grant and Keohane 2005) and healthcare
(Emanuel 1996), in terms of the standing of one party—the
account-taker—to expect certain behavior from another—
the account-giver. That is, any accountability relationship
is inherently a normative relationship. In fact, norms and
accountability relationships are inseparable. However, com-
puter science approaches on accountability lose a lot of its
core intuitive basis.
4.1 Traceability
Some approaches labeled “accountability,” e.g., (Argyraki
et al. 2007; Haeberlen 2010), address traceability of actions:
traceability is an important mechanism for holding someone
accountable, but is neither necessary nor sufficient for ac-
countability. Traceability is not necessary because account-
ability holds even without adequate traceability and could
be adequate depending upon assumptions of trustworthiness.
For example, a patient may hold a hospital accountable for
loss of privacy even if the loss was caused by an untraceable
attacker or by equipment failure. Traceability is not suffi-
cient because even perfect traceability can be circumvented
through external interactions. For example, if Alice circum-
vents traceability by getting Bob to act on her behalf, she
remains accountable for the norms she violates.
4.2 Utilities
Approaches based on utility, e.g., (Feigenbaum et al. 2011;
Feigenbaum, Jaggard, and Wright 2011; Conitzer et al.
2017) treat accountability as the negative utility accrued by
the accountable party for failing to act as expected. Con-
sider the following example to understand the shortcomings
of the above view. A nurse Don is prohibited from giv-
ing a Schedule III Controlled Substance to a patient Char-
lie without a prescription from a physician Alice. Let us
suppose Don risks losing his bonus if he violates the pro-
hibition. First, negative payoffs may serve as a deterrent,
but in providing an assurance mechanism, they remove ac-
countability. In essence, instead of norm N, Don is account-
able for the norm “N, but if you violate N, then penalty.”
Don need no longer give an account for violating N pro-
vided he pays the penalty. Second, seeing that Charlie is
flat-lining, Don may know that the probability of punish-
ment is zero, but that does not mean Don is not accountable
for administering controlled drugs. Third, sanctioning (in-
cluding rewarding (Radcliffe-Brown 1934)) an accountable
party is a process that is subsequent to accountability, not
incorporated in its definition (Emanuel and Emanuel 1996;
Grant and Keohane 2005). Indeed, Don could gain acclaim
(a social reward) if his quick action saves Charlie’s life.
4.3 Algorithms in Normative Settings
Bostrom and Yudkowsky (2014) give the example of a fi-
nancial company that uses an AI algorithm-based process
for approving mortgage applications. The algorithm does
not explicitly rely on any race-related criterion in granting
loans to applicants, and yet it turns out that the approval pro-
cess increasingly favors approving applications from white
applicants and rejecting those from black applicants. A re-
jected applicant brings a lawsuit against the company alleg-
ing discrimination. The company argues otherwise based on
the design of its algorithm. An investigation finds that the al-
gorithm rejects worthy black applicants. Bostrom and Yud-
kowsky point out that it may be difficult, even impossible,
to figure out the behavior of an advanced AI and use this
example to motivate desirable “social” properties of AI al-
gorithms, such as transparency and predictability.
Below, we examine the different ways in this narrative
may unfold once an agency starts investigating the outcomes
of the algorithm. For easier reference, let’s adopt these
names: the financial company, Finn; Finn’s algorithm, Algo;
and the regulatory agency, HUD. Suppose HUD finds the
outcomes produced by Algo questionable, because in aggre-
gate they fly in the face of non-discrimination norms, those
norms being codified as law. HUD calls Finn to account.
HUD may determine that Finn did not use any ethnicity-
related criterion in Algo and did not violate any fair-lending
norms. Let’s suppose HUD determines that Finn had no
foreknowledge that Algo would produce the undesired or
that Finn was negligent in any manner. Based upon these
facts, HUD absolves Finn of any wrongdoing.
We make the following observations before proceeding.
• In any organization of autonomous principals, norms
serve as the standard of correct behavior.
• Even when principals complying with the norms, ques-
tionable outcomes may be produced.
• Some principal should be accountable for the outcomes
(and, therefore, the mechanisms that participate in pro-
ducing it).
• Accountability is distinct from blame, which is closer to
the notion of a (negative) sanction. Finn is de facto ac-
countable to HUD because it is the subject of norms but
found to be not blameworthy.
5 Ethics in the Large
Instead of focusing on problems of ethics and narrowly on
agents, we should focus on ethics in the large; that is, we
should focus on making computational the sociotechnical
systems in which agents are embedded and their governance.
The norms of an STS are its objective ethics and yield an op-
erational basis for decision-making within the system.
We think of the norms of an STS as being its ethics for all
practical purposes. When a principal adopts a role in an STS,
the STS’s norms become a primary focus of the principal’s
attention and decision-making. No driving school instructs
its pupils in grand ethical dilemmas; all of them do how-
ever focus on drilling into their pupils the mundane norms
of driving, e.g., to keep your hands on the steering wheel at
all times and do not use a phone while driving.
Formulating appropriate norms for any complex STS
would seldom be straightforward and may involve consid-
4
erable deliberation and argumentation as various stakehold-
ers try to advance their own agendas. It is important that the
norms be clear or even objectively evaluable so as to avert
disputes about their satisfaction or violation.
5.1 Autonomy
In the foregoing, we have narrowed the problem of ethical
decision-making by agents as prima facie acting in a norm-
compliant manner. And accountability means that even they
are noncompliant, they may not be blamed. Further, gover-
nance means that noncompliant behaviors may be instituted
as required behavior by changing the constituted norms if
those behaviors are seen to promote the underlying values.
Such modifications to the constitution go back to our point
about autonomy and innovation. Whereas the norms serve as
the ethics, in principle, agents are free to act as they please.
Of course, they may also have to bear the brunt of negative
sanctions, if any.
Autonomy in AI is typically conceived of in terms of
cognitive capacity and the ability of an agent to perform
complex tasks without supervision, reflecting perhaps in
the complexity of the agent itself. In our conception, an
autonomous agent has no meaningful autonomy unless it
is connected via normative relationships and accountabil-
ity to other agents that circumscribe autonomy. These re-
lationships are public and they exist outside the agent by
fact of public communication between agents, regardless of
whether an agent may believe or intend (Singh 1998). In
other words, autonomy is a social phenomenon in our think-
ing, not a cognitive one. To be autonomous is to be account-
able and to be accountable is to be autonomous.
5.2 Ethical STSs
We claim that the idea of being ethical applies to STSs as
well. There is a history in human discourse of distinguish-
ing the system from an individual and claiming, e.g., that
the system was unfair so that the individual had no choice
but to do something unethical in a certain situation. That
is, the problem originated in the system. This tension is a
source of poignancy in literature, such as Les Mise´rables.
We can thus talk about ethical healthcare systems. For ex-
ample, many would find that a system that leaves people
uninsured for all practical purposes because of preexisting
conditions would be unethical. The frame of reference for
this evaluation is potentially a set of values that either do
not coincide with the set of values of this healthcare sys-
tem under consideration. Or, perhaps their values align, and
the shortcomings fall to the design of the healthcare system
being poorly characterized in term of its norms. This point
leads us to a conception of ethical STSs.
Definition 1 An STS S is ethical at time t from the point of
view of values V if and only if S’s outcomes align with V at
t.
This definition has several interesting features. One, it em-
phasizes outcomes over norms. Norms are crucially instru-
mental to outcomes, giving an operational basis for actions
by agents, but in the end, it is the actual outcomes that mat-
ter. The values V provide the frame of reference. V could be
the values of S itself but they could as well be the values of
another STS T. Such a conception enables looking at an STS
from the point of view of another. S and T may be both eth-
ical from their own respective points of view but S may be
unethical from T’s viewpoint and T from S’s. And, finally,
an STS is not always ethical or unethical. It may be ethical
today but because of inadequate governance (that lets values
and outcomes become misaligned) lapse into being unethi-
cal. Analogously, an unethical STS may later become ethical
because of responsive governance.
5.3 Adaptability and Emergence
If all agents are constrained to be ethical in the same way,
then there is less room for innovation in ethics. Any ethical
standard has a sociocultural context (Dignum 2017), which
itself is continually changing. One only has to look at the
many norms that have changed over the last two centuries,
e.g., concerning slavery, women’s rights, and gay rights.
Adaptation is a process of alignment, that is, the mini-
mization of deviation, between the values and norms and
outcomes. This yields a design perspective: What changes
would we need to make to a system to produce this align-
ment? For example, will adding resources help produce
alignment? Alternatively, are the specified norms undesir-
able, perhaps too weak (do not constrain enough, no penal-
ties for violations, and so on), or too strong (too constraining
or deterring)?
Let’s resume our loan-granting algorithm example. The
outcome was questionable but the fair lending norms were
not violated. In that case, HUD may propose altering the
non-discrimination norms to accommodate factors so that
the apparent loophole is closed. If the norms change, Finn
must either modify Algo to accommodate the altered norms
or risk noncompliance. Additionally, HUD may propose
norms as part of governance activities that commit finan-
cial companies to monitor outcomes and notify the agency
every quarter. Doing so would contribute to the value of fair
lending.
If the outcome is deemed acceptable, Finn may continue
using Algo. There is a variation where the outcome’s status
remains questionable. In such a case, HUD may propose just
the monitoring norms. We make the following observations.
• Norms can change to guide the likely outcomes in a de-
sirable direction. A change in norms is an adaptation of
the broader sociotechnical system in which computational
mechanisms operate.
• Computational mechanisms, e.g., algorithms may need to
change in response or the accountable parties risk non-
compliance.
6 Conclusion
Since the inception of AI as a field of study and in much
of the discourse on autonomous agents, the emphasis has
been on cognition, on intelligence—sense the environment,
reason about and learn from it, and select the most appro-
priate course of action for the current moment. As agents
are increasingly visible in the social sphere, it is important
to model STSs in which they are embedded and develop the
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concomitant methodologies, infrastructures, and tools that
help bring computational sociotechnical systems to life. The
question of ethics is not limited to agents alone; it applies
crucially and equally to STSs. Focusing on STSs provides
many benefits. No agent exists in isolation. And in contrast
to the difficult of ethics in general, the concrete ethics of
an STS as codified in its norms provide a clear operational
basis for action by agents. STS provide a basis for decision-
making and accountability. We gave a definition of ethical
STS in terms of values and outcomes.
A pertinent question for AI research is how can we com-
putationally support the governance of ethical STSs. Tra-
ditional operating systems support the execution of unitary
machines—more a case of top-down management than of
governance in our conception (Pitt, Schaumeier, and Artikis
2012; Singh 2013). What kind of “governance system” (GS)
would be needed to support an STS? An STS, unlike an ap-
plication that runs on an operating system is not a unitary
machine; the stakeholders are themselves part of the STS.
We anticipate that the GS would support public delibera-
tion methods such as argumentation and tools that help an-
alyze and aggregate arguments. The stakeholders would in
turn be supported by tools that help them understand the
“distance” between norms and outcomes. Such tools would
apply data mining to form models of the descriptive norms
from the outcomes. Additional tools would help connect
outcomes to values. Voting methods may support decision-
making among the stakeholders. These decisions could be
about, e.g., how the norms needs to be changed. Needless
to say, we would also need advances in formal languages to
represent norms. The future is wide open.
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